报告题目：Legal independence and corporate tax avoidance

报告人：李森

报告时间：2023年12月13日11:00

报告地点：1教 A4036

主办单位：5357cc拉斯维加斯

报告人简介：李森，西南财经大学金融学院2020级金融学博士生。研究方向为公司金融和绿色金融。

内容简介： 

We utilize a quasi-natural experiment with independence reform to examine how judicial independence influences corporate tax avoidance. We find that firms engage in less tax avoidance following the judicial independence reform. Channel tests indicate that improved judicial independence can undermine political protection and increase litigation risk, leading to lower corporate tax avoidance. Furthermore, the tax avoidance reduction effect of the reform is stronger for firms that are larger in size, engage more in bribery, and are located in cities with slower economic growth. Through the lens of judicial independence, this study provides novel evidence on a previously underexplored determinant of corporate tax avoidance.